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Abstract: The problem of Schrödinger’s Cat has figured prominently in the debates about the bearing of quantum
physics on our understanding of physical reality. On its basis, various theorists have maintained the quantum physical
world exhibits a probabilistically indecisive physical reality. The analysis of the paper that this appeal to quantum
reality is methodologically at odds with and disjoint from its underlying approach to quantum theory itself. If there is
to be methodological uniformity at this juncture it will have to be along the lines that Einstein always focused—an
incomplete hidden factor (perhaps better than “hidden variables”) approach.
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1. Quantum oddities
It is hard to escape the irony that physical science—our best hope for understanding how Nature works—is itself
the source of puzzlement and perplexity. And contemporary physics manifests this circumstance nowhere more clearly
than in the area of quantum theory.
Quantum physics seeks to explain the physical micro-processes that occur at very small levels of metric scale. And
these processes involve phenomena that are highly unusual when regarded from the vantage point of the familiar
macro-level of physical reality. Specifically, the anomalous phenomena at issue include such oddities as:
—Probabilism and unpredictability, as when we encounter such processes as the radical decay of heavy transuranic
elements; occurrences that are predictable with statistical probabilities on the larger scale, but individually
unpredictable.
—Complementary uncertainty of physical state parameters with a see-saw relation where the more precise
specification of one impels the other into greater unspecificity.
—Position ambiguity via an infeasibility of specifying the precise location of physical processes and providing for
continuity in physical interactions.
—State superposition with different quantum states combining or conjoining otherwise incompatible possibilities in
an impenetrable fog of indetermination.
—Wave-packet collapse with observation presenting a definiteness that physical theory does not provide for and
indeed disallows.
All such eventuations are “something completely different” from what we encounter in the course of ordinary,
everyday experience. For in the physics of the macro-objects encountered in everyday life we have transactions that are
subject to lawful determination, physical parameters that assume definite values not subject to probabilistic variation,
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descriptively different states that are disjoined and incomparable, and state-conditions that evolve in smooth continuity
and are not disjointed in abrupt inexplicability. At the physical macro-level where we humans routinely function, things
thus behave very differently from the ways of the quantum world.
2. Schrödinger’s cat and the basic problem posed by the quantum theory
Reality at the quantum level enjoys a dramaturgy of its own. Everyday reality as we experience it yields
observationally definite resolutions where theory can, at most, provide for probabilistically indefinite alternatives.
Quantum waves function with smooth regularity among alternative possibilities in line with Schrödinger’s Equation
unless and until observation intervenes to disrupt matters by the theory-inexplicable collapse to a single alternative. This
so-called “wave-packet” collapse is at issue in the curious thought-experiment of Schrödinger’s Cat.
This thought-experiment is predicated on the following suppositions. A cat is placed in an opaque box containing
apparatus that potentially produces a quantum event triggering the release of a jet of cyanide gas sufficient to kill the cat.
Otherwise no further changes occur in the box. Eventually the box is opened and the life-condition of the cat
determined. There are two possibilities: life or death.
The question now is: has a quantum event transpired? When the box is opened, will the cat be dead or alive? Prior
to the box’s opening, quantum theory does not declare YES or NO but only MAYBE with a certain probability. To be
sure, when we open the box we are going to reveal the life-condition of the cat and so will definitely determine whether
a quantum event has or has not happened. But until that happens all we have is the theory’s indecisive indetermination
which leaves the cat’s life-condition in limbo between life and death. The quantum event issue emplaces the cat in a
probabilistic halfway house (“superposition”) between life and death, whereas when we open the box there is a
“collapse of the wave-packet”—a transmutation of the theory’s probabilities into a definite yes or a definite no.
We thus confront what might be called the Basic Problem of Quantum Physics, namely that quantum theory
presents us with a range of alternatives, while nevertheless observational reality provides a single definite condition.
If quantum reality is ultimately basic and comprehensively determinative for physical processes, how can it be that
while this theory predicates imprecision and indefiniteness, nevertheless when we subject its phenomena to interactions
at the physically observable macro-level the results we realize are always precise and definite and never exhibit the
alternative-embracing indefiniteness that quantum theory envisions?
3. Responses to the basic problem
Confronting this disconnect between physical theory and experiential observation, quantum theorists have opted
for several varying responses:
1.Quantum Positivism. The contrast between a unique observational reality confronting a wider spectrum of varied
theoretical possibility is an illusion. That uniqueness is not an aspect of physical reality, but only the product of a
psychological (observationally dependent) outcome due to the fact that we discern only limited aspects of reality. (Bohr)
2.Quantum Incompleteness. The theory is incomplete. It would require some sort of amendment and
supplementation to account for that unique objective reality. (de Broglie, Bohm)
3.Quantum Conjunctivity. All those possible alternatives are in fact actually realized. Every component of the
spectrum of possibility is actual reality—within its own sector of a vastly enlarged all-comprehensive framework to
which observational experience affords only very limited access. (Everett/Wheeler)
These three reactions to the relevant anomalies represent the principal lines of approach in quantum theorizing in
recent years. Each has a different, characteristic approach to the reconciliations of dissonance.
4. Attitudinal stances towards quantum theory
Now, the crucial consideration here lies in the combination of two facts:
—That quantum physics envisions a physical reality that is indecisive among conflicting alternatives unless and until
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there is a theory-external supplementation via the cognitive experience of observers.
—That quantum theorizing presents a situation that is indecisive among conflicting alternatives unless and until
there is a differentiating supplementation via the cognitive experiences of theoretics.
Ironically, even as quantum physics itself under-determines the exact detail of physical states, so quantum
theorizing under-determines the exact detail of quantum phenomenology. And at this point quantum theoreticians divide
into three doctrinal schools:
1.Positivists. Here we are called on to abandon the quest for a unique reality that countervails against the
possibilistic pluralism inherent in quantum physics. Those who adopt this position effectively say “Just do your
quantum theoretical calculations and accept the physical results they indicate without demanding a definiteness of
descriptive resolution that is not to be had.” (This is basically the stance of the Copenhagen school.)
2.Incompletists. Here we are called on to abandon the idea that quantum theory as we have it affords a complete
account of physical reality. Those who adopt this position effectively say “Press ahead in research towards a larger and
more comprehensive account of physical phenomena that can provide for unique resolutions where existing quantum
theory yields only a spectrum of probabilistic, all disjointed alternatives.” (This would be the attitude behind the de
Broglie/Bohm theory of electron motion via quantum wave direction.) Such an approach would have it that quantum
theory needs to be developed, augmented, and modified to achieve a definite resolution of the issues.
3.Conjunctivists. Here we are called on to acknowledge that there is something to be said for all of those variant
approaches. Those who adopt this position effectively say “Don’t abandon any of them, but retain all of them, each
to be used for illuminating one sector of the problems at issue.” In effect, view the venture as a comprehensive tool kit
accepting different tasks by different means.
Given these three alternatives, we are faced with a situation of déjà vu at the theoretical meta-level of alternative
quantum perspectives that is effectively isomorphic with the situation obtaining at the ground level of quantum physics
itself. For the uncertainty one confronts in the phenomena of quantum physics is now reproduced once more in an
uncertainty in regard to quantum theorizing.
For at this point it transpires that every theorist has his own favored position. And so, even as observational
experience plunges quantum experimenters into a world where quantum alternatives have but one single definite
resolution for them, so scientific experience at large plunges quantum physicists into a world where theoretical
alternatives have but one single resolution acceptable to them. In sum, there is a deep parallelism between the
predicament of quantum physics and the project of quantum theorizing itself.
How is one to bring order into the resultant confusion? To make progress here we have to go back to basics.
Display A
The acceptability of higher-level theories as enjoined by that of base-level theories
Corresponding First Corresponding Second
Ground-Level Meta-Level Meta-Level
Possibilities Conditions Conditions
T0 T1 T2 T01 T11 T21 T02 T12 T22
        
        
        
         
        
         
         
        
KEY:
T01 affirms that none of the Ti hold
T11 affirms that (exactly) one of the Ti holds
T21 affirms that all of the Ti hold
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5. Eliminating some alternatives
Let us embark on an analysis of the generic situation that is at issue here. We begin with a number of
alternative base-level theories—for simplicity let it be just three: T0, T1, and T2. And let it be that in principle any one of
them could be correct and appropriate.
But now consider the survey of theoretical possibilities presented in Display A. Starting from the vantage point of
the Ti we can move on to the next level of the Ti1—and thereafter to the Ti2 as per:
•T02 none of the Ti1 is true
•T12(Exactly) one of the Ti1 is true
•T22All of the Ti1 are true
But note that the basic principle of rational practice (to the effect that “like inputs yield like outputs”) will have it
that the first- and second-level resolutions be identical. And observe that the only possible prospects for
agreement between Ti1 and Ti2 are those cases that have been starred, namely those where exactly one of the Ti obtain.
These three cases uniquely and alone afford the prospect of procedural uniformity across the two meta-levels of
deliberation. We are thus led—on a purely methodological basis—to have it that exactly one of those three ground-level
theories must hold.
And there is another way of looking at the matter as well. Let us adopt the rational uniformity of treating theories
via the same principles that they themselves use substantively in relation to the phenomena. This would call for
reasoning about our theories in the same way that they themselves reason about their subject matter. In relation to
quantum theorizing, the result of this approach is pictured in Display B.
Conjunctivism as per (3) in Display B is not a systematically harmonious approach seeing that it itself is simply
one alternative that it cannot consistently endorse. And again, Experiential Positivism as per (1) is not systematically
harmonious because the “observation” at issue in the Quantum Theory is interpersonally uniform, whereas the
“experience” at issue in such theory differs from individual to individual. Only the invocation of external factors as a
means to uniqueness presents an alternative that is coherently uniform as between the substantive and the
meta-theoretical levels of deliberation. An analogue to the hidden variables account would present the only viable route
to uniformity. The preceding methodological approach would accordingly seem to rule out the “no definiteness”
indecision of the Copenhagen school, as well as the “everything goes” perspective incorporated in the Everett/Wheeler
Display B
QUANTUM THEORY QUANTUM META-THEORY
How theorizing views How meta-theorizing views
quantum-physical states quantum-physical theories
(1) EXPERIENTIAL POSITIVISM
Only one possible outcome is actualized, Only one possible version is acceptable
not for physical but merely substantive to theorists in line with their experience
reasons provided by observers [Bohr]
(2) INCOMPLETEISM
(“Hidden-variable supplementation to established theory”)
Only one possible state is ever observationally There is a single correct version of
realizable (for reasons whose explanations quantum theory for theoretical reasons
require resources above and beyond the whose determination requires resources
reach of orthodox quantum theory) [Bohm] beyond the reach of present theorizing
(3) NON-SELECTIVE CONJUNCTIVISM
All possible physical states are actualized All theoretically plausible doctrines
in some possible world [Everett/Wheeler] are actualized in some issue-contexts
many-worlds theory. It is, to be sure, possible that a variant of the Everrett/Wheeler approach can be projected. That
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would meet the uniqueness requirement that results. This would be a theory in which every theoretic possibility is
realized in this actual world. To achieve this, one would return to the idea—as old as Aristotle’s On Interpretation—that
incompatibilities can be combined temporally: one now and another then. On such a temporalized version of
Everett/Wheeler, one could have it that all those manifold quantum possibilities are indeed realized—but for the most
part so briefly as to be effectively absent. The original Everett/Wheeler approach accommodates incompatible states by
allocating this to different worlds; the presently contemplated variant allocates them to different times. On this approach
there would need to be a time when superposition has it that Schrödinger’s Cat is both alive and dead. But this bizarre
condition could be realized in a near-instantaneous time span—one so small that neither we nor the cat or anyone, save
possibly God himself, could possibly notice. So here the “hidden variable” is something that is so easily
overlooked because it lies before us in plain sight—being nothing other than time itself.
In any case, however, the recourse to procedural rationality contemplated here speaks decisively for some sort of
“hidden factor” (perhaps better than “hidden variable”) “Incompletist” approach that looks to a completion of quantum
theory along the lines that Einstein always favored—chance-averse rationalist that he was. If the classic principles of
rational regularity and uniformity are to prevail, then we have to expect that in the final analysis a particular
substantively orthodox theory will ultimately emerge to resolve the uncertainties inherent not only in but also about
quantum theory.
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